

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1314

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PLENARY SESSION JANUARY 22, 1974

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE VIENNA MBFR CONFERENCE MET IN PLENARY SESSION ON JANUARY 22 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE CONFERENCE HEARD ONLY ONE STATEMENT, THAT OF POLISH REP (STRULAK). THE POLISH STATEMENT NOTED THAT UP TO THIS POINT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD DEMONSTRATED A DESIRE TO WORK TOWARDS FORCE REDUCTIONS AND THAT ALL MUST NOW TRANSLATE THIS DESIRE INTO AN ARGUMENT. THE POLISH REP CONSIDERED THE 8 NOVEMBER EASTERN PROPOSAL AS A REALISTIC BASIS FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT. HE REITERATED THE EASTERN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND STRESSED THAT TO BE MUTUALLY  
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ACCEPTABLE AN AGREEMENT MUS 1) BE BASED UPON THE EXISTING STABLE

FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE, 2) INCLUDE EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, AND 3) INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTIONS IN NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. END SUMMARY. COMPLETE TEXT OF POLISH REP (STRULAK) FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. SPEAKING FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE NEW YEAR I WISH TO START BY EXTENDING OUR BEST WISHES TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS OF THESE TALKS.

2. IT HAS BECOME A STRADITION TO GRASP THIS OCCASION FOR  
MAKING EVALUATION OF THE PAST YEAR AS WELL AS DRAWING PROG-  
NOSTICS FOR THE FUTURE.

3. IT SEEMS THAT WE ALL DO SHARE A VIEW THAT WE HAVE STARTED AN IMPORTANT ENDEAVOUR TO CONSOLIDATE DETENTE, SECURITY AND PEACE IN EUROPE. THE BEGINNING WAS MARKED BY BUSINESSLIKE ATMOSPHERE AND APPARENT DESIRE TO SUCCEED. THIS REMAINS TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR.

4. BUT TO MAKE THESE NEGOTIATIONS MEANINGFUL, WE HAVE TO TRANSLATE THE DESIRE INTO ACTUAL AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND THIS IS THE TASK YET AHEAD OF US IN THE NEW YEAR. REALISM AND RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER'S INTERESTS ARE NATURAL AND ESSENTIAL PREMISES FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THEY ARE, INDEED, PREMISES FOR THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CO-SPONSORED BY MY DELEGATION TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR AND USSR AND PRESENTED ON THE 8TH OF NOVEMBER 1973. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THIS DRAFT SUGGESTS A MOST REALISTIC, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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ARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES THROUGH A SET OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF SECURITY, UNDER- MINE THE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA AND IN ERUOPE AS A WHOLE.

6. WE ARE BEING TOLD THAT THE WESTERN PLAN PURSUES THE OBJECTIVE OF AN EQUAL OUTCOME BUT THAT THIS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH LARGELY UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES. THE

SOCIALIST STATES WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ALMOST THREE TIMES AS MUCH AS THE WESTERN STATES.

7. IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WESTERN PLAN, WHICH IS THE ONLY ONE CONCRETELY SPELLED OUT, THE 15 PERCENT REDUCTION WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE AMERICAN GROUND FORCES MAKING UP FOR JUST ABOUT ONE QUARTER OF THE TOTAL NATO MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE OTHER THREE QUARTERS WOULD REMAIN UNTOUCHED. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD DEMAND THAT ABOUT FIFTY PER CENT, ACCORDING TO WESTERN CALCULATIONS, OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTIES IN THE AREA SHOULD INSTEAD BE TAKEN AS THE BASIS FOR THE REDUCTION RATION OF 15 PERCENT. I WONDER HOW, BY WHAT RULES OF ARTHMETICS SUCH A PROPOSAL MAY BE PRESENTED AS A "FAIR" ONE.

8. THE UNEQUITABLE CHARACTER OF THE RECUTION OF GROUND FORCES SUGGESTED IN THE WESTERN PLAN IS STILL AMPLIFIED BY COMPLETE OMISION IN THAT PLAN OF THE AIR FORCE AND NUCLEAR

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FROM US REP MBFR

WEAPONS IN THE AREA.

9. YET, WE ARE BEING ASSURED THAT SUCH UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS WILL HELP INCREASE CONFIDENCE, STABILITY AND WILL EVEN PERMIT TO PRESERVE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS.

10. WE CERTAINLY CANNOT DENY THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, ONCE IMPLEMENTED, WOULD INDEED ENHANCE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSTURE OF NATO STATES IN EUROPE, AND THEREFOR THEIR FEELING OF REASSURANCE. HOWEVER, I SUBMIT THAT THIS IS SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT FROM MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND COMMON FEELING OF STABLE SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE LATTER CAN BE PROMOTED ONLY BY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, THE SOLUTIONS THAT WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL THE

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PARTIES.

11. IN OUR VIEW, THE WESTERN PLAN DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS, IT TENDS TO INFRINGE UPON THESE INTERESTS. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN JUDGEMENTS ABOUT WHAT IS OR WOULD BE ADEQUATE OR MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR OUR SECURITY AND ORAL ASSURANCES TO THAT EFFECT. WE ARE BOUND TO MAKE OUR OWN JUDGEMENTS AND WE MAKE THEM THROUGH CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. IT IS SUCH ANALYSIS THAT TELLS US THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR SECURITY INTERESTS THESE PROPOSALS ARE UNEQUITABLE AND DEFECTIVE.

12. I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT UNEQUITY. IT STANDS OUT MOST CLEARLY FROM THE RATION OF THE PROPOSED NUMBERS OF TROOPS TO BE REDUCED ON BOTH SIDES. THE DEFECTIVENESS OF THE WESTERN PLAN IS MOST EVIDENT IN THE DELIBERATE EXCLUSION OF AIR FORCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS WELL AS IN THE HIGHLY DUBIOUS CONDITIONSL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN AMERICAN AND SOVIET. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE RESPECTIVE COMBAT VALUE OR PRACTICALITY OF REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES VERSUS AIR FORCE OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONE NEED NOT BE A MILITAR SPECIALIST TO KNOW THAT ALL THOSE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS DEPEND ON EACH OTHER AND MAKE FOR THE OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

13. IT IS WITH A KIND OF SURPRISE THAT WE HAVE NOTED THE ARGUMENT USED BY THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE DANGERS OF EXCALATION TO THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT ARE SUPPOSEDLY INHERENT PRIMARILY IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES RATHER THAN IN THE EXTENSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ONES. THIS LINE OF THINKING CAN HARDLY FIND SUPPORT AMONT THE EXPERTS AND EVEN LESS

AMONG THE PUBLIC OPINION OF ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY WHICH IS WELL AWARE BOTH OF THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF THEIR ENORMOUS STOCKPILES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS THIS CONCENTRATION THAT MAKES THE REGION PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE LETHAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

14. WE HAVE LONG PERCEIVED THIS DANGER AND, AS YOU WELL KNOW, POLAND MADE REPEATED EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE DIMINISHING OF THE THREATS IMPOSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE BEEN AND STILL ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS IS OF ESSENTIAL IMPORTANCE TO

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DETENTE IN EUROPE.

15. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE DANGERS INHERENT IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMASSED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE FACT IS THAT TO-DAY - TO NO NESSER DEGREE THAN IN THE PAST - THE WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA ARE EQUIPPED WITH THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND VARIED DELIVERY SYSTEMS WHICH ARE PART AND PARCEL OF THE NATO COMBAT CAPABILITY.

16. WE SHOULD HAVE IN MIND THAT THE WESTERN PLAN, TABLED ON THE 22 NOVEMBER 1973, NOT ONLY TENDS TO INCREASE THIS ROLE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THE AREA BUT ALSO LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN FOR A FURTHER EXPANSION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES.

17. THE POLISH DELEGATION WOULD DEFINITELY CONSIDER MEANINGLESS A PLAN WHICH WOULD OVERLOOK THE BASIC ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

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18. I SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIS THAT - TO THE BEST OF OUR UNDERSTANDING - COVERING THE MOST DEADLY WEAPONS BY THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT IS IN THE VITAL INTEREST OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING NATIONS, AND ESPECIALLY - OF THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

19. ANOTHER MAJOR DEFFICIENCY OF THE WESTERN APPROACH LIES IN SUGGESTING THAT THE REDUCTION OF NATIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO A PHASE II. APART FROM BEING MADE CONDITIONAL UPON A NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIAL FACTORS, THE TERMS OF THIS PHASE ARE, TO SAY THE LEAST, UNCLEAR. THE FORMULA OF THE PROPOSED SECOND PHASE IS, INDEED, VERY VAGUE. IT SETS SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THERE IS A WESTERN INTENTION AT ALL TO PRACTICALLY CONSIDER THE REDUCTION O F FORCES OTHER THAN AMERICAN ON THE PART OF THE NATO STATES.

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20. NOW, THE REDUCTION OF NATIONAL TROOPS ALONG WITH THE FOREIGN ONES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO US. THE POLISH DELEGATION AS WELL AS OUR COLLEAGUES FROM THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED IT AT LENGTH. FOR POLAND THE READINESS TO TAKE PART IN THE REDUCTION PROGRAMME IS OUR LOCUS STANDI IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESENCE OF ALL OTHR DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IS MOTIVATED BY THE SAME INTENTION.

21. AN EQUIVOCAL REDUCTION SCHEME, WHICH WOULD, IN FACT, NOT COVER A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE NATO TROOPS IN THE AREA AND THEREFORE ALLOW THEIR UNIMPEDED STRENGTHENING, MAY ULTIMATELY RESULT IN A KIND OF NEW ERUOPEAN ARMS RACE. SUCH

A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE VERY AIMS OF THE VIENNA TALKS AND TO EUROPEAN DETENTE. POLAND, SIMILARLY AS OUR SOCIALIST ALLIES, WOULD DEFINITELY NOT LIKE TO HAVE THIS HAPPEN. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO DO THE BEST TO PREVENT IT.

22. IN OUR CONSIDERED OPINION, THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY THE SIMULTANEOUS INCLUSION OF THE FORCES OF ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTION PROGRAMME AS WELL AS BY A CLEAR OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE ANY PART OF THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WITHIN THE AREA. THIS IS THE SOLUTION SUGGESTED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TABLED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF SOCIALIST STATES.

23. WE SUBMIT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EACH SIDE, OF EVERY NATION CONCERNED AS WELL AS OF THE CONTINENT AS A WHOLE. THE REDUCTION PROGRAMME ENVISAGED IN THIS DRAFT AGREEMENT IS, IN THE FIRST PLACE, EQUITABLE. THE EQUITY OF THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE DRAFT IS ITS PRINCIPAL QUALITY. IT MAY BEST BE SEEN IN THE METHOD OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE-WISE REDUCTIONS. I SHOULD LIKE TO OBSERVE THAT EQUAL PERCENTAGE DOES NOT MEAN IDENTICAL NUMBERS OF TROOPS TO BE REDUCED. THOSE STATES WHO HAVE MORE WILL IN PRACTICE REDUCE LARGER NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS. NOE IS EXPECTED TO GAIN ADVANTAGES WHICH WOULD RUN TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE OTHER SIDE. INSTEAD, ALL WILL EQUALLY GAIN FROM THE ENSUING MILITARY DETENTE AND THE ECONOMY OF RESOURCES. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE PROPOSED TIMING AND RATIOS

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OF THE REDUCTIONS ARE PRACTICAL AND REALISTIC. THE SUGGESTED APPROACH IS CONCRETE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD, BUT NOT A SIMPLISTIC ONE. WE TAKE DUE ACCOUNT OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES BUT ALSO OFFER THE EFFICIENT WAY TO TACKLE THEM.

MR CHAIRMAN,

24. OUR CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE WESTERN APPROACH SHOULD BY NO MEANS BE READ AS MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO ENTER INTO STERILE POLITICS. WE HAVE MADE IT WITH THE INTENTION TO PROMOTE THE SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, IN WHICH POLAND IS MOST PROFOUNDLY INTERESTED. PERMIT ME TO STRESS OUR CONVICTION THAT SUCH A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND THROUGH:

- PROCEEDING FROM THE EXISTING REALITIES AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE;
- EFFECTING THE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS WITHIN THE AREA ON THE EQUAL BASIS;
- INCLUDING INTO THESE REDUCTIONS ALL THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, I.E. GROUND, AS WELL AS AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS AT THEIR DISPOSAL.

25. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES WILL BE  
ABLE TO FULLY REALIZE THE MERITS OF THIS APPROACH AS THE BASIS  
FOR AGREEMENT. END TEXT. HUMES

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